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 1 
DIGITAL CLUSTER MARKETS 




 This paper considers the role of “cluster” markets in antitrust 
litigation, the minimum requirements for recognizing such markets, 
and the relevance of network effects in identifying them.  Finally, it 
considers how we can avoid them. 
Many antitrust violations require proof of market power, or 
the power profitably to reduce output and raise price above cost.  
Historically the way antitrust litigants and courts have estimated 
power is by determining a market share of a properly defined 
“relevant market.”1  The concept of a “market” is hardly limited to 
antitrust, however, and has been a feature of partial equilibrium 
analysis in microeconomics at least since the time of Alfred 
Marshall2 and, before that, Cournot.3 
 One foundational requirement of markets in antitrust cases is 
that they consist of products that are either identical or at least very 
close substitutes for one another.  As a result, it is meaningful to say 
that the products within a market compete with one another, while 
products inside the market do not compete with products located 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey 
Law School and The Wharton School. 
1See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 
Ch. 5 (5th ed. 2021) (in press). 
2Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 385 (1890). 
3AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH ([1838] Nathaniel Bacon, 
trans. 1897) (hypothesizing discrete markets for undifferentiated 
commodities). 
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outside of it.  Even though markets are nearly always porous, this 
principle is very robust in antitrust analysis and there are few 
deviations. To be sure, many markets consist of differentiated 
products, particularly for manufactured goods as opposed to 
commodities. Differentiation can give rise to difficult issues about 
whether two products are sufficiently far apart from one another in 
product space that their competition is slight and they should not be 
placed in the same market.4  For example, are video cassette or DVD 
movies, theater-shown movies, and digitally streamed movies all in 
the same market simply because viewers can be observed switching 
among them?5 
 Manifestly, however, markets do not consist of complements, 
which are goods that are either used together (complements in use) or 
produced together (complements in production). Complements 
generally behave in just the opposite way from the substitutes that 
form a market.  For example, while all the products in the same 
market have prices that move up or down together, the prices of 
complements typically move in the opposite direction.  This is so 
because a buyer usually uses complements together and willingness 
to pay usually depends on the price of the combination.6  If the price 
of one product goes up the price of the other must go down.  For 
 
4Famously in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377 (1956) (grouping cellophane, wax paper, tin foil, and 
common wrapping paper into a single market).  See 2B PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶539 (5th ed. 
2021) (in press).  
5E.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 
1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987) (grouping diverse technologies for 
watching video content into the same market); United States v. Syufy 
Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 659, 665 
& n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (similar: all movies: theatrical first- or 
subsequent-run, video rentals, and cable television). 
6 By contrast, if two goods are complements in in production output 
of the two will rise or fall together.  As a result, increased output of 
one in response to increased demand may cause an excess of output 
in the other, and thus falling prices. 
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example, if the price of gasoline goes up people drive less, and this 
will put downward pressure on the price of cars. 
The fact that complements are used together has fooled some 
courts into thinking that they are in the same market.  For example, 
the Ninth Circuit once held that the fact that a photocopier requires 
all of its repair parts entailed that they should all be placed into an 
“all parts” market.7 But that states the relationship precisely 
backwards: the reason we put, say, four closely spaced gasoline 
stations into the same market is because the buyer does not need to 
go to all of them.  Rather she needs only one, and this forces the 
firms to compete to be her choice. 
 Many firms sell more than one product and frequently the 
products are non-competing.  When such a firm is accused of a 
market power antitrust violation it is usually important to assign that 
power to a single product or perhaps a small number of products 
where the threat of monopoly is occurring.   For example, in the 
Microsoft case the defendant was accused of monopolizing the 
market for operating systems for Intel-based computers.  The accused 
product was the Windows OS, and not other products such as 
Microsoft Office, which it also manufactured.8 
 But suppose a firm is accused more generally of an antitrust 
violation involving a large range of products, many of which are non-
competing.  The issue has arisen in numerous contexts.  One is the 
 
7Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 
1203 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998) (citing the 
“commercial realty” that a firm needs access to all of the replacement 
parts for a photocopier to include that there was a single all parts 
market). 
8United States v. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (relevant market must include all products “reasonably 
interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose,” and this limited 
the market to operating systems for Intel-based computers, thus 
excluding the MAC OS). 
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evaluation of hospital mergers.9  The merger concern is the hospitals’ 
exercise of market power, but hospitals provide a very large range of 
services most of which do not compete with one another.  For 
example, abdominal surgery does not compete with brain surgery, 
which does not compete with a lab test or an ultrasound.  One thing 
that all of these procedures have in common is that they are 
performed within the hospital.  Clearly, however, that cannot be 
sufficient to put them into the same market. For example, Wal-Mart 
sells toasters and chainsaws in the same building, but that hardly 
justifies defining a “toaster/chainsaw” market. 
Suppose, however, that numerous firms in a region offer only 
product A, numerous others only product B, and still others only 
product C. If only one firm offers all three products together, is that 
“cluster” a relevant market, of which it has 100 percent, or does the 
market include the other firms?  The answer to that question could be 
critical in an antitrust case involving a firm such as Amazon, which 
has largely nondominant positions in most of the individual and 
noncompeting commodities that it sells.  However, it aggregates 
more of different products together and sells them in a higher volume 
than almost any firm save Walmart.10 
This process of aggregating noncompeting products or services 
leads to the creation of “cluster markets,” which are markets that 
consist of noncompeting goods.  It then becomes important to ask 
when it is sensible to locate power in the cluster itself rather than in 
 
9See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 566-567 
(6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2015) (FTC correctly 
grouped noncompeting services that used similar facilities and 
assets). 
10See Top 100 Retailers 2019, available at  (showing Walmart as 
largest, with $387 billion in annual sales; and Amazon as second, 
with $121 billion).  If the sales are limited to e-commerce, Amazon is 
the largest.  See “Market Share of Leading Retail e-commerce 
Companies…”, available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/274255/market-share-of-the-
leading-retailers-in-us-e-commerce/.  
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the simple presence of any particular item.  Clustering is not 
appropriate simply because a firm sells two or more noncompeting 
goods.  Rather, there must be some reason for thinking that the act of 
clustering creates the power. 
In general, clustering contributes to market power only when an 
antitrust court is satisfied that: 
(1) many customers need or at least prefer the convenience of 
receiving the defendant’s grouping of products rather than any 
single one,11 or 
(2) economies of joint provision (economies of scope) make joint 
distribution of the cluster cheaper per good than distribution of 
each separately, and 
(3) entering into competition with the cluster is difficult. 
Later we consider one additional rationale that the courts have not yet 
addressed but that could be relevant to the estimating the market 
power of platforms subject to network effects.12 
Clustering nonsubstitutable goods is occasionally useful and 
frequently simplifies litigation, provided these limitations are 
followed. 
Of these three criteria, the first and second refer to the nature of 
demand.  The third refers to supply.  A relevant market for antitrust 
purposes is a grouping of sales for which both the elasticity of 
demand and the elasticity of supply are sufficiently low to warrant 
the conclusion that a firm or cartel that controlled the sales could 
profitably reduce output and raise the price above cost.13  So what we 
are trying to identify is a cluster of products that is uniquely attractive 
to consumers, but also that is difficult to create and supply.  As a 
result the inference is strong that the firm controlling this cluster 
 
11 See Ian Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE 
L.J. 109 (1985) (emphasizing role of transactional complements). 
12 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
13 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.1 (6th ed. 2020). 
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could charge sustainable prices above the competitive level.14 
Note that the two demand-side items, (1) and (2) are expressed in 
the alternative and distinguish two quite different situations.  In the 
first, the cluster market exists because consumers want the cluster, or 
perhaps want some portion of the cluster that varies from customer to 
customer, or from visit to visit.  Facebook very likely falls into this 
category.  It offers a variety of noncompeting services, including 
photo posting, video posting, messaging, bulletin boards, discussion 
groups, timelines of other users, a dating service, and so on.  
Different subscribers use these things in differing proportions and 
some may not use certain features at all.  But the immediate and 
ongoing availability of the cluster is itself valuable to customers, as is 
the ability of existing members to add or drop a particular service. 
In the second category are situations where clustering results 
from joint costs or economies of scope, and thus the clustered seller 
can offer either lower prices or better results than the non-clustered 
seller.  For example, a hospital may offer obstetrics, thoracic surgery, 
and radiology treatments.  In this case the typical patient does not 
visit the hospital for all of them.  She may want only one, but 
clustering either reduces the cost of the individual services or permits 
individual services to take advantage of common technologies that 
reduce costs or improve quality.15 
 For example, a customer going to Amazon to purchase a 
toaster will typically not purchase a chainsaw as well.  Further, most 
of the time we can assume that the customer does not prefer Amazon 
for its toaster purchase simply because Amazon also carries 
Chainsaws.  As a result, rationale (1) on the above list does not apply.  
 
14 Cf. Emigra group, LLC v. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, 
LLP, 612 F.Supp.2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (if “buyers could and 
would respond to a price increase by a full line seller by shifting all 
or part of their business to partial line or single product sellers, or by 
making or providing the product or service themselves, then a cluster 
market would not be appropriate”). 
15 Cf. Sharif Pharm., Inc. v. Prime Therapeutics, LLC, 950 F.3d 911, 
918 (7th Cir. 2020) (incorrectly limiting cluster market definition to 
situations where “the cluster is itself an object of consumer demand,” 
but then concluding that surgical services could be a cluster market). 
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That leaves rationale (2), which queries whether there are economies 
of scope that accrue to offering multiple products in the same facility.  
Here the answer is maybe.16  We might require expert testimony to 
prove it, but it is certainly plausible that a firm can spread certain 
costs over a larger variety of products and that large sales volume in 
the aggregate, as opposed to a single product, will give it a cost 
advantage over a smaller firm that sells only one product.  Note that 
this is not the same thing as saying that the firm is very large, but 
rather that the act of clustering multiple things together reduces costs. 
That would then leave the third question, which is whether a 
firm currently providing a smaller range of products could readily 
expand to the larger range.  Once again, the answer is maybe, and the 
question is factual and specific to each situation.  If a store currently 
selling lumber cold easily add plumbing and electrical components to 
its inventory, then clustering is not likely to increase power.17 
Cluster Markets in Antitrust Cases 
 Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have recognized 
antitrust cluster markets several times, often without expressly 
relying on these criteria.  For example, in United States v. 
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that “commercial 
banking,” which was a cluster of various types of accounts, loans and 
other financial services constituted a relevant market although other 
financial institutions such as savings and loan associations provided 
many of these individual services.18  Either or both of the first two 
 
16Cf. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F.Supp.3d 100 117-118 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(good discussion, recognizing the aggregation of diverse office 
supplies as a cluster market, but citing factors that this was 
analytically convenient and market shares for the individual products 
were similar). 
17Cf. Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 
1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1989) (no distinct cluster market for stores that 
grouped building supplies and paint where any store could readily 
group them).  See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
18United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963) 
(referring to the “cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and 
services (such as checking accounts and trust administration) denoted 
by the term ‘commercial banking”). 
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conditions stated above were apparently satisfied.  As the Court 
observed, consumers deposited funds in commercial banks though 
other institutions paid more interest, and for many users there was a 
“settled consumer preference” for commercial banks.19 The third 
condition was also satisfied because at that time commercial banks 
alone provided checking accounts, they had certain cost advantages 
in other services, and entry into commercial banking was limited by 
law.20 
Likewise, both economies of joint provision and consumer 
preference explained the cluster market found in the Supreme Court’s 
Grinnell decision involving central station property protective 
services.  These included burglary alarms, fire alarm service, and 
flooding alarms.21 A fire alarm service is not substitutable for a 
burglar alarm service, and so one.  While some firms provided only 
one or a limited number of the various services, the central station 
offered economies of joint provision that would give a monopolist of 
the combination a decisive cost advantage over those who offered the 
services separately. Under the technology of the day, central station 
services connected covered homes by a wire to a central station, and 
sensors for motion, window breakage, smoke, fire, and so on were 
connected to the same phone line and monitored from a single center. 
 
19 Id. at 356 
20 See also United States v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 
660–66 (1974) (identifying “commercial banking” as a relevant 
market, although noting that future developments in regulatory policy 
might make it “unrealistic” to distinguish savings banks from 
commercial banks); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust 
Co., 399 U.S. 350, 379–83 (1970) (“commercial banking” market 
though the main business of these merging banks resembled that of 
savings and loan associations excluded from the market). 
21United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).  See also FTC 
v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holdings, ASA, 341 F.Supp.3d 27 (D.D.C. 
2018) (agreeing with FTC that a cluster market existed for a variety 
of water treatment products and services).  Cf. Premier Comp 
Solutions, LLC v. UPMC, 377 F.Supp.3d 506, 528-529 (W. D. Pa. 
2019) (rejecting cluster market of cost containment services because 
the defendant appeared to be the only firm that offered the cluster, 
but that is hardly decisive and may have shown only that the 
defendant was a monopolist). 
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This was almost certainly cheaper than it would be for different firms 
to duplicate the network, each of them offering a single type of 
protection. The relevant questions would then be whether the offeror 
of the combined services could profit by charging a price 
significantly above its costs, while preventing other firms from 
offering a similar set of combined services. If the answer to both 
questions is yes, then the grouping is a relevant market. 
Often the “clustering” problem serves to refocus our attention on 
the precise input that is being monopolized. Consider a relevant 
market for “surgical services.” Clearly, a heart bypass is not a 
substitute for an appendectomy, and neither one is a substitute for the 
surgical repair of a gunshot wound. But the problem of clustering 
nonsubstitutes vanishes when we realize that any source of monopoly 
power lies in the facility, in this case the hospital’s operating room, 
supporting equipment, and trained medical staff. 
 Thus, for example, a local telephone company may have 
monopoly power over its telephone network, which we can describe 
as a relevant market.  This can be true notwithstanding that the 
various services dependent on the network, which include voice 
conversations, fax transmissions, and internet access, may not be 
good substitutes for one another. While in Grinnell the Supreme 
Court considered itself to be clustering noncompetitive products, 
such as fire and burglary alarm protection, the then-existing 
technology of the central station alarm protection industry indicates 
that the adopted grouping was not “clustering” at all so much as the 
simple provision of remote protective services and alarm connections 
through a single telephone line.22 
 
22 On the technology, see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. 
Supp. 244, 249 (D.R.I. 1964).  See also Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 
977 F. Supp. 1362, 1379 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (dicta: “physicians 
services” not an appropriate cluster market because buyers do not 
purchase all of them together, ultimately concluding that this finding 
did not undermine plaintiffs’ claim, for defendants had power even 
when the various services were considered separately); Premier 
Comp Solutions, LLC v. UPMC, 163 F.Supp.3d 268 (W.D.Pa. 2016) 
(denying motion to dismiss; cluster market for insurance services 
involving workers compensation); Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health 
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When these economies are less obvious, most customers want 
only one among many services, or the cluster is readily copied, the 
courts are much less likely to find a cluster market.23  For example, 
one court rejected a proposed market of retail “home centers” selling 
electrical, plumbing and building supplies but excluding stores that 
sold only one or two of those items.24 Another court rejected a  
proposed market of multiline restaurant equipment distributors 
allowing restaurants the convenience of “one-stop shopping” for 
equipment and supplies.25 
 
First, Inc., 2015 WL 275806 (M.D.Fl. Jan. 22, 2015) (denying 
motion to dismiss on claim involving an alleged cluster market of 
medical diagnostic services). See also Messner v. Northshore 
University HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) (bundle of 
hospital services could be a product market).  Cf. FTC v. Advocate 
Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2016) (parties agreed to 
cluster market definition in hospital merger case). 
23 See, for example, the inconclusive discussion in Intellectual 
Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 280 F.Supp.3d 691, 
702-704 (D.Md. 2017), over the existence of a cluster market for a 
patent portfolio covering a group of diverse financial services 
patents. 
24Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 
1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1989) (that “do-it-yourselfers” on large projects 
might prefer the convenience of one-stop shopping does not suggest, 
for example, “that specialty stores selling house paint are unable 
through price reductions or other marketing strategies to lure 
significant numbers of do-it-yourself builders,” especially those 
doing simpler projects, “into buying at a specialty store even if they 
purchase all their other supplies at a home center”). 
25Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (defendant’s alleged advantage in supplying multiple 
products not shown to prevent either (a) buyers from turning to 
others in the event of price increase or (b) suppliers from increasing 
their own lines relatively quickly).  See also United States v. Ivaco, 
Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989), where two merging 
suppliers of railroad track “tampers” claimed a broader market, 
including other “maintenance of way” equipment that neither 
competed with tampers nor reflected similar manufacturing 
technology). 
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In these cases the courts properly focused on the facility 
providing the nonsubstitute goods, but they refused to find a relevant 
market because there was no evidence that the combinations could 
not readily be duplicated by other sellers in response to 
supracompetitive prices. For example, a customer searching for a 
hammer is not likely willing to pay a higher price for it from a store 
that also sells other types of building supplies.  Even if the customer 
wants both a hammer and a saw, however, finding a cluster market 
would require evidence that it would be difficult for a store selling 
hammers to add saws. 
A few courts have incorrectly found cluster markets where none 
of these conditions appears to have been met.  For example, in Image 
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Ninth Circuit found 
a cluster market of “all parts” for Kodak photocopiers, 
notwithstanding that there was no common facility in which the parts 
were produced and apparently no economies of scope in joint 
production.26 Indeed, there was not even a single producer.  Kodak 
itself produced about 30 percent of aftermarket parts for its 
photocopiers, and numerous other manufacturers produced the rest. 
The only rationale that the court gave for grouping 
noninterchangeable goods into a single market is administrative 
convenience, which can certainly justify clustering if its limitations 
are carefully kept in mind.  For example, in the Brown Shoe merger 
case the Supreme Court grouped men’s, women’s, and children’s 
shoes into the same market, but only because the defendant could not 
show any advantage to treating them separately.  In fact, the relevant 
parties’ market shares for the various types of shoes were about the 
same, and as a result nothing would turn on separating them.27  
Likewise, in Philadelphia Bank the Court clustered noncompeting 
banking services such as checking accounts and business loans into a 
single market because the evidence indicated that the defendant had 
 
26125 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1094 (1998). 
27Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 327–28 (1962) 
(“whether considered separately or together, the picture…is the 
same”). 
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roughly equivalent positions in all.28 It did not have, say, a dominant 
position in checking accounts but a nondominant position in 
commercial loans. Indeed, the Court also recited market shares in 
each of the separate markets that it found to be well above the then-
existing thresholds for merger illegality.29 At that point, it was 
administratively convenient to consider the markets together. 
The Kodak decision spoke as if the alternative to clustering was 
to consider each of 5,000 parts separately, but that would hardly be 
the case.30 As in any antitrust case, the plaintiff would have to allege 
which parts were subject to monopoly and which were not. That 
might be worth the effort with respect to only a small number of the 
parts. The rationale for clustering should have disappeared as soon as 
it was clear that the defendant’s market position varied from item to 
item in the proposed cluster. To illustrate, suppose the aftermarket 
parts for a Chrysler automobile include a transmission, which is a 
heavy piece of specialized hardware made only by Chrysler, and also 
a paper oil filter, which is an easily duplicated item made by dozens 
of manufacturers. Adopting a cluster market containing both the 
transmission and the oil filter in such a case eliminates any 
possibility for addressing the fact that Chrysler’s competitive position 
in its transmissions is significantly stronger than its competitive 
position in its oil filters. 
Network Effects and Cluster Markets 
Large digital platforms often provide numerous products or 
services.  Can these be clustered into a single relevant market for 
 
28United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
29Id.. at 331, noting that the post-merger bank would have 36 percent 
of the area banks’ total assets, 36 percent of deposits, and 34 percent 
of net loans; see also id. at 360 n.36 (enumerating separate and 
significant market share figures for commercial and industrial loans, 
personal loans, real estate loans, lines of credit, personal trusts, time 
and savings deposits, and demand deposits). 
30Cf. Godix Equip. Exp. Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1570 
(S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d, 144 F.3d 55 (11th Cir. 1998) (no relevant 
market for replacement parts made by Caterpillar for its own tractors 
when more than 90 percent of the parts could also be made by other 
firms). 
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purposes of antitrust analysis?  The same criteria that delineate 
cluster markets in traditional technologies also apply to digital 
platforms, but there is also one additional one. 
On the supply side, the extent to which network effects 
operate as a substantial entry barrier has been widely debated.31  
Many people have suggested that networks are “winner-take-all” 
markets, or natural monopolies.  That is almost certainly not true, 
however, for the majority of networks.32 Nevertheless, network 
effects can sometimes operate as a significant entry barrier, although 
mainly vis-à-vis new entrants attempting to enter with an identical 
product.33 The FTC’s antitrust  complaint against Facebook 
acknowledges this, alleging both that entry barriers into Facebook’s 
market are high,34 but also that the biggest threat of entry is not from 
clones but rather from “differentiated products that offer users a 
distinctive way of interacting….”35  To the extent that a differentiated 
entrant faces a different demand curve the usual rules governing 
natural monopoly markets with declining costs do not strictly apply.  
A firm can enter even if costs are declining. 
On the demand side, significant network effects can 
sometimes provide an important rationale for cluster markets.  Single 
side, or “direct,” network effects make a particular platform more 
 
31E.g., Yael v. Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist, & Yang Lu, 
Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of 
Venture Capital, 65 J. FINANCE 829 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 
84 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).  Cf. Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an 
Entry Barrier, 119 Q. J. ECON. 159 (2004).  For skepticism, see 
Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and the Conditions of Entry: 
Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87 (2001). 
32 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 
YALE L.J. (2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3639142.  
33 Ibid. 
34 See Facebook Compl., supra note __, ¶¶65-68. 
35Id., ¶69. 
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valuable as the number of users increase, although that fact alone 
does not necessarily provide a rationale for clustering diverse 
services.  For example, a telephone network is more valuable as a 
person can talk to a larger number of other participants, even if the 
only thing they do is talk. “Indirect” network effects can do the same 
thing on two-sided markets, making the platform more valuable as 
the number of participants on the other side increases.  The Uber ride 
hailing platform becomes more valuable as the number of riders 
increases because this will attract more drivers.  Conversely, a greater 
number of drivers will attract more riders. But these effects result 
without regard to the variety of services. 
 By contrast, economies of joint provision can result from 
common costs, or costs that can be distributed across two or more 
products or services, whether or not they are competing.  For 
example, it is very likely less costly for Uber to expand into UberEats 
food delivery with its existing technology and network of drivers 
than it would be for a new firm to start food delivery on its own.  At 
least some of the costs can be shared across both services.  That then 
provides a rationale for grouping Uber rides and Uber eats into a 
cluster market. 
When network effects are present, an important variation 
resulting from common costs is what might be called “scope” effects, 
or increased value that accrues as a group of goods or services 
offered on the same platform becomes not only more numerous but 
also more diverse. For example, suppose Uber has traditionally 
served only passengers but now adds UberEats, a food delivery 
service employing the same vehicles, drivers and management 
technology.  The result is that the network of Uber users will become 
larger as it expands to include people who might use UberEats but 
were not using Uber.  A single network that includes 1000 Uber ride 
customers and 500 UberEats customers will have significant cost and 
network advantages over two separate networks for each of these 
buyer groups. 
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When Uber’s participation balancing between drivers and 
riders is in equilibrium it will be able to increase platform size or 
returns only by reducing its own costs or markup.36  If it attempts to 
increase its user base by cutting fares, it will repel drivers.  This 
results from the interdependent demand structure of two-sided 
markets: lower fares will attract riders but discourage drivers. 
A promising alternative way for Uber to increase its 
profitability is to expand into a new product or service that rides on 
Uber’s existing investment.  One the demand side, rides and food 
delivery have largely independent demand: usually they are neither 
substitutes or complements. That is, at any particular point of market 
engagement most customers want one or the other but not both, and 
one is not a good substitute for the other.  The result of two different 
demand functions is that adding food delivery enables Uber to 
enlarge its customer base without sacrificing fares and repelling 
drivers.  To the extent that clustering ridership and food delivery 
increases the user base, Uber profits.  For example, if the food 
delivery market is 40% of the rides market Uber could enlarge its 
passenger base from 1000 fares to 1400 fares without cutting prices.  
On the other side of the market, the availability of drivers would 
increase to the extent that more fares are available, provided the 
drivers were able to transport both passengers and food. 
By clustering different services, other platforms such as 
Amazon or Facebook do the same thing.  For example, Facebook 
certainly becomes more valuable as it has more participants on all 
 
36 On participation balancing on two-sided markets, see Erik 
Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 722-724 (2019); 
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress 
Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006).  See also E. Glen Weyl, A 
Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1642 
(2010) (more generally, factors that produce more participation on 
one side ordinarily lead to less participation on the other side). 
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sides.  It also becomes more valuable to these participants, however, 
as it increases the range of activities that members can perform. This 
in turn will attract more users. These include the ability to chat with 
friends, to share photographs or videos, to form of join discussion 
groups dedicated to a particular subject, to promote a business, plan 
events, and so on. 
Many of these services, such as photo sharing, video sharing, 
and messaging, are noncompeting.  Some may function as 
complements in use (i.e., users use them together, such as photo 
posting and messaging), but other may be quite independent of one 
another.  To the extent they are offered on the same platform and 
share some common costs they are all complements in production.37  
As a result Facebook’s base of users gets larger as it offers more 
product diversity and this in turn attract greater advertising revenues. 
 In its antitrust complaint against Facebook the FTC alleges a 
relevant market of “personal social networking services.”38  The 
complaint at the time of this writing does not refer to these services 
as a cluster market.  Rather, it mentions the facts that the services are 
collectively built “on a social graph that maps the connections 
between users” and other contacts.39  Second, what the services share 
is “features that many users regularly employ to interact” with 
others.40  Third, these include “features that allow users to find and 
 
37 On complements, see discussion supra, text at notes __. 
38Complaint ¶ 64, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv-03590-JEB 
(D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020) [hereinafter FTC Facebook Compl.].  See id., 
¶52: 
Personal social networking services are a relevant product 
market. Personal social networking services consist of online 
services that enable and are used by people to maintain personal 
relationships and share experiences with friends, family, and 
other personal connections in a shared social space. Personal 
social networking services are a unique and distinct type of online 
service. 
39 Id., ¶53. 
40 Id., ¶54. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820062
2021 Digital Cluster Markets 17 
 
connect with other users….”41  In addition, the complaint explains 
why other services, including YouTube, Spotify, Netflix, and Hulu 
are not in this relevant market – mainly because they specialize in 
media for passive consumption and not in order to communicate with 
others.42  The complaint also alleges that professional networking 
services such as LinkedIn, as opposed to social networking services, 
are not in the relevant market.43 
 
Facebook’s motion to dismiss, which was filed in March, 
2021, responds that the FTC “has not alleged a plausible relevant 
market, because it fails to allege “a market that includes all products 
that consumers consider acceptable substitutes.”44  The motion also 
states that the FTC “does not allege any facts that would permit the 
Court to discern which products (or even which features of 
Facebook) are in the alleged market and which are not.”45  Further, 
“It does not and cannot define the market using the standard analysis 
of cross elasticity of demand, i.e., the effect a change in price for one 
product would have on demand for another.”46 
 
 These responses all ring true of a simple market limited to a 
single product.  Things that are inside a market should be close 
substitutes, which is simply another way of saying that they have 
high cross-elasticity of demand.  As a result, the prices of one firm’s 
good within a market and another firm’s good in the same market 
will move up and down together.  If the market is product 
differentiated, they may do this imperfectly, but they will do it 
nonetheless. 
 
41 Id., ¶55. 
42 Id., ¶58. 
43 Ibid. 
44Memorandum in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss 
FTC’s Complaint 12, FTC v. Facebook, No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB 
(D.D.C. March 10, 2021).  Cf. Carl Shapiro’s Expert Report in the 
Staples case 13 (noting defendant’s objections that cluster market for 
consumable office supplies was “not consistent with Market Reality.”  
Expert Report of Carl Shapiro, FTC v. Staples, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-
02115 (EGS) (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2016).  The FTC eventually prevailed 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820062
18 Hovenkamp, Digital Cluster Markets April, 2021 
 
 
 Cluster markets are different, however.  For example, the 
group of diverse services offered by a hospital, such as abdominal 
surgery, obstetrics, and anesthesiology, do not experience high cross 
elasticity of demand, and prices do not necessarily move up and 
down together.  Some of them are complements in use, such as 
surgery and anesthesiology, which means that patients consume them 
together, as they would hot dogs and mustard.  Others are 
complements in production, such as different types of surgery 
performed in the same operating room and with at least some 
common costs.  Indeed, all of them may be complements in 
production to the extent that cost saving attach to performing them in 
a common facility.  The relevant market exists, not because there is 
high cross elasticity of demand among the various offerings, but 
rather because there are significant customer conveniences and 
preferences that adhere in the aggregation or else economies of joint 
provision, and the aggregation is difficult to duplicate.47 
 
 Further, the criticism that the FTC’s complaint falls to allege 
which features are in the market is a red herring.  Clusters can differ 
from another, just as hospitals do.  Further, in many cluster markets 
the precise aggregation of products and services changes over time.  
For example, a hospital may add heart transplants or third degree 
burn treatment or other critical care procedures to its menu, or a 
central station security service may add video monitoring.  If 
Philadelphia Bank added internet-based bill pay, it would still be a 
cluster market, but one that offered one additional service.  The 
rationale for the market definition is the clustering of services in a 
way that increases consumer satisfaction or reflects economies of 
joint provision.  The list of individual items in this cluster can easily 
vary in both directions without undermining the rationale. 
 
 Which of the individual services is contained in a firm’s 
cluster could be relevant in a private competitor lawsuit alleging 
harm that is focused on a particular product or service. In a 
 
47 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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government suit, however, the only query is whether the cluster as a 
whole is a meaningful aggregation capable of exercising power.48 
 
 In two-sided markets it is not uncommon that firms exercise 
power on one side while they obtain their revenue on the other side.  
That is true, for example, of Facebook and Google Search.49 There, 
the question is whether Facebook’s market power in its position as 
offeror of social network services places it in a position either to 
charge anticompetitive prices or impose unreasonably exclusionary 
practices on advertisers or other businesses with whom it deals. 
 
Cluster Markets and Direct Proof of Power 
 
 Clustering is one way to approach the market power problem 
in a cases involving multiproduct digital platforms such as Facebook.  
It is not necessarily the best way.  To date, clustering has been used in 
the case law mainly for purposes of market definition, and thus 
applies to “indirect proof” by reference to a share of a relevant 
market. 
 
Proof of power by reference to a share of a defined market is 
usually termed “indirect” because of the number of inferences it 
requires.  In most cases, estimating a market share of a relevant 
market does not permit us to quantify market power, but only to draw 
a relatively general inference that it exists and some rough ideas 
about magnitude.  Technically, market share can produce an accurate 
measure of market power only if we know the market elasticity of 
demand and the supply elasticity of fringe competitors, and even then 
 
48 This is thy the causation requirement in a private government 
antitrust action is much more specific and focused than in a 
government enforcement action.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Harm and Causation, __ Wash. Univ. L. Rev. (2021) (forthcoming), 
available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3771399.  
49 See Hovenkamp, Platform Monopoly, supra note __. 
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only in a market made up of undifferentiated products.50  To the 
extent we lack good information about these variables, our 
assessment of power will be less accurate.  To the extent a defined 
market includes differentiated products it will understate power 
because everything inside the market is regarded as perfectly 
substitutable.51  By the same token, to the extent it excludes 
differentiated products that compete to any extent, it tends to 
exaggerate power. 
 
 By contrast, “direct” proof relies on estimates of firm 
elasticity of demand, evidenced mainly by firm output responses to 
individual firm price changes.52  These methodologies are capable of 
giving more accurate measures of market power as it is best defined, 
which is the ability of a firm to profit by raising its price above its 
costs.53 They are also able to take product differentiation into account 
by identifying residual demand elasticities facing individual firms.  
Under perfect competition with undifferentiated products a firm’s 
attempt at a unilateral price increase would be precisely offset by 
output increases by other firms, making the price increase 
unprofitable.  Under differentiation this will not necessarily be the 
case, and the differences can be estimated.54  For that reason, the 
methods tend to be preferred by economists.  They have the 
additional advantage that in many cases they can slice through the 
 
50William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937-938 (1981) (measuring 
power by reference to the Lerner Index, which expresses power as a 
relationship between marginal cost and the profit-maximizing price).  
51 See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶506c (5th ed. 2021) (forthcoming) 
52 See Id., ¶521. 
53 See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 437 (2010). 
54 On this point, see Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, 
Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing A Single Firm, 6 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283, 285 (1988). 
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clustering problem by taking aggregated supply or demand as given.  
They are more technical, however, and virtually always require the 
use of an expert economist. 
 
One interesting thing behind the identification of cluster 
markets is that the process uses many of the same tools that are used 
to assess power directly. We infer the existence and strength of 
complements, or economies of joint provision, or of the range of 
network effects by examining the economics of market demand and 
supply directly.  As a result, there is already a great deal of “direct 
measurement” that goes on in the determination of cluster markets.  
For example, products are complements when their demand functions 
are interrelated in the sense that an increase in demand for one will 
occasion increased demand for the other. 
 
 In the context of digital platforms, direct measurement has the 
advantage that the data that it relies on are usually aggregated so as to 
reflect the total value that customers place on a seller’s offerings. For 
example, if the issue is an advertiser’s willingness to pay to place an 
ad on Facebook we would usually look at the residual elasticity of 
demand facing Facebook directly, without worrying about which 
components of that demand are due to video posting, message 
services, and the like.  For example, once having identified the wide 
range of office supplies sold by Staples as a cluster market, the 
plaintiff’s expert in that case assessed the demand for these products 
overall.55  Likewise, issues relating to whether “professional” social 
media services such as LinkedIn should be included in the same 
market would not detain us, because direct measurement should be 
able to determine the extent to which they compete with one another. 
 
 In a few cases courts have looked to both cluster market 
definitions and direct measurement in order to assess power.  
Typically they regard these as alternative methodologies for 
 
55See Shapiro, Staples Expert Report supra note __ at 3-4. 
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answering the same question.  In merger cases the approach may also 
reflect that the case law is widely interpreted as requiring a market 
definition as a matter of law, even though direct measurement would 
be preferable under the circumstances. The expert may in fact be 
relying on direct measurement, but presents the evidence as 
bolstering a conclusion drawn from market definition. 56 
 
 For example, in Wilhelmsen the FTC blocked a merger among 
two providers of water treatment chemicals and related services.57  
These included various boiler water products and services (BWT) as 
well as cooling water treatment and services (CWT).58  The court 
properly rejected the objection that BWT and CWT were not 
substitutes for each other. That would be true in the case of traditional 
market definition, but not when the query is whether a cluster of 
services should constitute a market.  However, the court also relied 
on expert testimony to conclude that the output of the two firms was 
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the merger would produce 
increased prices.59 
 
56See United States v. H & R Block, 833 F.Supp.2d 36, 84-85 & n.35 
(D.D.C. 2011) (acknowledging this issue; then delineating a relevant 
market and also assessing residual demand directly which does not 
independently require a market definition). 
57FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holdings, ASA, 341 F.Supp.3d 27 
(D.D.C. 2018). 
58 Id.at 48. 
59 Id. at 57-59 (relying on direct measurement – here, the 
hypothetical monopolist test – to include that BWT and CWT were 
within the same market).  See also FTC v. Advocate Health Care 
Network, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding cluster market for 
hospital services and permitting expert to use hypothetical 
monopolist test to estimate power); Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health 
First, Inc., 2016 WL 4272164 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2016) (finding 
both a cluster market and accepting direct expert evidence on power).  
See Carl Shapiro & Howard Shelanski, Judicial Response to the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 58 Rev. Indus. Org. 51 (2021) 
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In the Staples merger case the court defined a cluster market 
that covered a diverse and noncompeting group of office supplies, but 
then used expert testimony under the hypothetical monopolist 
formula to assess post-merger demand.60  This enabled the expert to 
conclude “that a monopoly  provider of consumable office supplies 
would charge significantly more to large customers than Staples and 
Office Depot today charge these same customers.”61  This issue did 
not turn on questions such as whether paper and staples were 
substitutes, complements in use, or simply separate products.  Rather, 
it was the availability and convenience of the package that determine 
the power of the stores. 
This direct measurement approach evades the cluster market 
problem by not requiring a market definition at all. because it 
involves estimating the transaction or perhaps other costs savings that 
result from clustering.62  
 
(approving this approach in Wilhelmsen case for products that are 
“sold together but not substitutes for each other”). 
60 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F.Supp.3d 100, 121-122 (D.D.C. 2016).  
On the hypothetical monopolist test in merger analysis, see Justice 
Department and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§4.1.1, 4.1.3 
(2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-
guidelines-08192010.  
61 Id. at 122.  See also In re McWayne, 2014 WL 556261 (FTC, Jan. 
30, 2014), aff’d, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir.) (FTC found a cluster market 
of numerous noncompeting pipe fittings, confirmed by expert’s 
hypothetical monopolist test). 
62 See Ian Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE 
L.J. 109, 114-115 (1985) (cluster markets defined in terms of 
economies of scope and transactional complementarities).  Accord 
Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 123, 166 (1992) (also noting the inconsistent 
rationales that courts have used for clustering).  Contrast Jonathan B. 
Baker, Market Definition: an Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 129 (2007) (arguing against overuse of clustering to support 
traditional market definitions). 
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Another advantage of direct measurement is that it can also 
estimate the transactional or complementarity value of aggregating 
services.  For example, Facebook is more valuable to customers than, 
say, five discrete sites that individually offered messaging, photo 
sharing, video posting, news, and discussion boards.  This increased 
value from clustering will show up in any direct measure that takes 
Facebook as given and consider price and output responses 
accordingly. For example, when an advertiser determines its 
willingness to pay for a Facebook placement, that value reflects the 
size of Facebook’s customer basis, which in turn reflects Facebook’s 
success in creating demand by clustering diverse services. 
 
Conclusion, and a Warning About Remedies 
 
 While cluster markets seem inconsistent with the general 
theory of relevant markets in antitrust, they nevertheless perform a 
useful function when either consumer preference or economies of 
joint provision justify grouping noncompeting products or services 
together.  To this, network effects provide an additional rationale, 
particularly when the range of network effects increases as the 
variety of a firm’s offering increase.  We might speak of this as 
economies of scope in consumption. 
 
 At the same time, the economics of clustering also carries a 
useful message about remedies.  The very phenomena that explain 
why we cluster diverse products or services into a single “market” for 
antitrust purposes also explains why clustering occurs in the first 
place.  Whether because of economics of joint provision, consumer 
preferences for complementary features, or broad network effects, 
firms cluster when it is valuable.  As a result antitrust enforcers 
should be very cautious about remedies that break up clustered 
platforms.  The purpose of the antitrust laws is not to make products 
perform less well, to injure consumers, or to harm labor or other 
input suppliers who profit from high output.  Remedies should be 
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designed to avoid these situations.  This suggests that in most 
instances breakups, other than divestiture of acquired companies, 
should be avoided.  Fortunately a wide range of remedies are within 
the equitable powers of the courts.63 
 
 
63 For exploration of the possibilities see Hovenkamp, Platform 
Monopoly, supra note __. 
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